Changing fortunes during economic transition : low-wage persistence before and after German unification by Gürtzgen, Nicole & Nolte, André
Dis cus si on Paper No. 16-028
Changing Fortunes During  
Economic Transition –  
Low-Wage Persistence Before and  
After German Unification
Nicole Gürtzgen and André Nolte
Dis cus si on Paper No. 16-028
Changing Fortunes During  
Economic Transition –  
Low-Wage Persistence Before and  
After German Unification
Nicole Gürtzgen and André Nolte
Download this ZEW Discussion Paper from our ftp server:
http://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp16028.pdf
Die Dis cus si on Pape rs die nen einer mög lichst schnel len Ver brei tung von  
neue ren For schungs arbei ten des ZEW. Die Bei trä ge lie gen in allei ni ger Ver ant wor tung  
der Auto ren und stel len nicht not wen di ger wei se die Mei nung des ZEW dar.
Dis cus si on Papers are inten ded to make results of ZEW  research prompt ly avai la ble to other  
eco no mists in order to encou ra ge dis cus si on and sug gesti ons for revi si ons. The aut hors are sole ly  
respon si ble for the con tents which do not neces sa ri ly repre sent the opi ni on of the ZEW.
Changing Fortunes During Economic Transition - Low-Wage
Persistence before and after German Unification
Nicole Gu¨rtzgen1, 2) and Andre´ Nolte3)
1) Institute for Employment Research, Nuremberg
2) University of Regensburg
3) Centre for European Economic Research, Mannheim∗
March 30, 2016
Abstract
This paper studies whether the transition from a centrally planned to a mar-
ket economy offers new perspectives for those who, in economic terms, were
relatively deprived under the old regime. Previous empirical research on this
question has been limited by the availability of representative longitudinal
micro-data that track individuals’ labour market careers across different po-
litical regimes. Our study seeks to fill this research gap by looking at the
transition of Eastern Germany following German Unification. Using a unique
large-scale German administrative data set, we measure individuals’ relative
economic position by exploiting information on whether individuals were in
the bottom of the pre-unification wage distribution. We then address the
question of how workers’ low or high-wage status determines their wage and
labour market status within and across different regimes. We document strong
evidence of a dynamic selection process into low-wage employment after Uni-
fication. Furthermore, consistent with a weak connection between individu-
als’ true productivity and their pre-unification low-wage status, the extent of
across regime state dependence is found to be small in magnitude and appears
to vanish over time. For males, the small extent of across regime dependence
is found to be most pronounced among the medium and high-skilled, suggest-
ing the depreciation of general human capital as a potential explanation.
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1 Introduction
Does the transition from a centrally planned to a market economy offer new per-
spectives for those who, in economic terms, were relatively deprived under the old
regime? Or does the economic transformation bring along an equally unfavourable
position under the new system, thereby reflecting some extent of economic state
dependence even across completely different political and economic regimes? This
question is of considerable relevance against the background of Eastern and Central
Europe’s recent history of transitions from centrally planned to market economies
and is crucial to understand the welfare implications of economic transitions. The
issue is also important from a quantitative point of view, as during a large part of
the 20th century about one-third of the world’s population lived under communist
regimes.
In this paper we address these issues in the context of Eastern Germany. The for-
mer German Democratic Republic (GDR) is a particularly interesting case because
it has experienced a unique pathway of political and economic transformation after
1989 through its Unification with the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). Com-
pared to other transition countries, the transformation process took place much
more quickly, as the political and economic system of Western Germany was im-
mediately transferred to Eastern Germany. Although a large body of research has
documented the evolution of the Eastern German labour market after Unification,
there is barely any evidence on how one’s pre-unification relative economic position
determined one’s fortunes after Unification. Previous empirical research on this
question has been limited by the availability of suitable representative longitudinal
micro-data being able to track individuals’ labour market careers across different
political and economic regimes. Our study seeks to fill this research gap by exploit-
ing a unique large-scale administrative data set (BASiD) from the German Pension
Register and the German Federal Employment Agency. The BASiD data provide
an ideal basis for our empirical analysis as it allows us, first, to identify individuals
living in Eastern Germany before Unification and, second, it enables us to track
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individual employment histories both before and after the fall of the Iron Curtain.
To our knowledge, no other study has used administrative data to compare labour
market outcomes across different political and economic regimes.
To measure individuals’ relative economic positions, we will exploit information
on the incidence and duration of individuals’ position in the bottom part of the
pre-unification wage distribution. Even though earnings inequality in the GDR was
considerably lower than in the FRG, one may still identify workers who fared con-
siderably worse than the average. For instance, in 1989 the poorest ten per cent of
the working age population earned less than 50 per cent of the overall average of
monthly earnings.1 Having identified individuals’ low-wage status prior to Unifica-
tion, we then proceed to ask as to how workers’ low or high-wage status determines
their economic fortunes after the transition. In particular, we are interested in the
extent of low-wage state dependence across economic regimes by distinguishing per-
sistence in low pay due to observed and unobserved heterogeneity from true state
dependence, also referred to as genuine state dependence.
The literature on state dependence acknowledges three main explanations for
genuine or true state dependence of low pay (see e.g. Stewart, 2007, Arulampalam
et al., 2000). The first one refers to signalling low productivity levels as employers do
not observe the true productivity and use the relative wage position as an additional
signal for the purpose of evaluation. As to the signalling argument, the heavily
regulated pre-unification labour market should have rendered the selection into low-
wage jobs based on workers’ true productivity very unlikely in the GDR. Given
that workers had their wages set according to a centrally determined wage grid,
Bird et al. (1994) suspect that “because the human capital model was obviously
not relevant under socialism, the observed correlation between wage income and
schooling and experience in the GDR must simply exist because the socialist wage
regime took factors like these into account in assigning wages”. If this was indeed
the case, signalling low productivity should not have contributed to genuine low-
1Own calculations from the 1990 German Socio-Economic Panel retrospective GDR survey.
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wage persistence for the pre-unification period. Given the different economic models
before and after Unification, the signalling argument would also not serve as an
explanation for low-pay persistence across the different regimes.
A further explanation for low-pay persistence may be stigmatization as long as
low-wage jobs are systematically associated with characteristics, such as social class
affiliation, against which employers might discriminate. In the GDR it is reasonable
to think of low-wage jobs as having - at least to some extent - resulted from political
discrimination. This in turn might have favoured true persistence due to signalling
political opposition. Even though the nature of stigma is likely to considerably differ
across the different regimes, such an effect could be present and lead to persistence
within each regime. Note, however, that stigmatization is unlikely to contribute to
”across regime” genuine state dependence.
A final explanation for low-pay state dependence that may be relevant even
across the regimes relates to human capital depreciation. Given that selection into
a pre-unification low-wage job should have been unrelated to workers’ true produc-
tivity, the latter might still have been depreciated due to unfavourable working or
job conditions inherent to low-wage jobs. Whether this led to true state dependence
largely depends on the extent to which depreciation has affected workers’ job-specific
or general human capital. Given that general skills have been shown to be transfer-
able to the post-unification labour market (Fuchs–Schu¨ndeln and Izem, 2012), a loss
in general human capital caused by pre-unification low-wage jobs might contribute
to true low-wage persistence even during economic transition.
In exploring the importance of workers’ pre-unification wage positions for their
post-unification wage outcomes, our analysis contributes to the literature on labour
markets of transition economies. A large body of research has examined how returns
to human capital have changed during economic transition. The general picture that
emerges is that returns to education generally increased, whereas returns to work
experience did not change or even decreased during the transition process (see e.g.
Rutkowski, 1996, Brainerd, 1998, Mu¨nich et al., 2005). For Germany, Bird et al.
3
(1994) and Krueger and Pischke (1995) show that there was little change in returns
to education after Unification. Moreover, these studies document very small returns
to age and seniority prior to Unification, which - similar to what has been found for
other transition economies - declined during the transition process (see also Gath-
mann, 2004). Orlowski and Riphahn (2009) show that returns to experience and
seniority in Eastern Germany were small compared with Western Germany, even
20 years after Unification. While these results indicate that specific human capi-
tal gained during socialist work experience became obsolete in the post-unification
labour market, very little is known about the consequences of experience accumu-
lated in low-wage jobs. In addressing the relevance of individuals’ pre-unification
wage positions for their post-unification outcomes, our analysis thus provides new
insights into whether low-wage jobs in a centrally planned economy have also been
associated with the depreciation of general human capital, thereby leading to ad-
verse long-term consequences for post-unification labour market outcomes.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides institu-
tional background information on the Eastern German labour market prior to and
after Unification. Section 3 provides a description of the data set and the sample
selection. Section 4 explores the evolution of wages and provides a description of
labour market transitions as well as unconditional probability estimates. Section 5
lays out the econometric strategy and presents the estimation results on short and
long-run dynamics. Section 6 concludes.
2 Institutional Background
2.1 The Eastern German Labour Market prior to Unifica-
tion
Following the Soviet example, the GDR introduced tight central economic planning
along with subordination of firms to the state administration. Moreover, all citizens
of the GDR had the constitutional right and duty to work (where the ‘right’ included
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an unlimited guarantee of employment and the ‘duty’ brought along the threat to
be sentenced for antisocial behaviour if one was suspected of remaining voluntarily
jobless). The Eastern German labour market before Unification thus was heavily
regulated: controlling the supply of and demand for labour was seen as an instrument
for efficient use of resources and economic growth (see Gru¨nert, 1997a for a detailed
overview).
Although enterprises were effectively controlled through centralised redistribu-
tion of investment capital, salary funds, and other financial means, they were fairly
free in planning and using the labour forces they had at their disposal. Under given
general institutional constraints, enterprises could influence, for example, employ-
ment policies, regulations pertaining to job transfers, salary ranges, and promotion
regimes. At the same time, individuals were – in principle – free to choose their
workplace. Once employed, they agreed upon an individual labour contract with
their firm, which included far-reaching employment rights (such as the right on em-
ployment appropriate to acquired skills or the right to be paid according to the
quantity and quality of the work done).
There were clear limits to employer and occupational mobility, though. By the
late 1970s, careers had become heavily affected by an increasing influence of the
“state-governed labour force allocation”, a system that restricted younger cohorts
in the choice of occupational training and their subsequent job (Huinink and Solga,
1994). Since the 1960s, quotas were set for occupations into which individuals were
allocated after leaving secondary education. Since the late 1960s, the opportunity
to study at a university was strongly restricted through quotas to high-school and
university admissions. This implied that many young people could not get the
occupation they actually wanted. Very often changing one’s work was then only
possible within one’s occupational career via adult education (also see Zu¨hlke and
Goedicke, 2000). A restriction on employer mobility was a general tendency among
GDR enterprises to keep the fluctuation of their labour force low and to maintain
a high level of permanent staff (Stammbelegschaft; see Gru¨nert, 1997b, Section 1).
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In addition to offering firm-specific fringe benefits like free childcare, holiday ar-
rangements, etc., an important mean of achieving this were bonuses such as ‘loyalty
premiums’ (Treuepra¨mie) for long-term employees. Enterprises had more discretion
over bonuses than over base wages, where bonuses have been estimated to account
for, on average, six per cent of compensation in the GDR (Krueger and Pischke,
1995). Base wages were determined by state-regulated wage grids based on observ-
ables (see Stephan and Wiedemann, 1990 for a more detailed account of the wage
structure in the GDR). As a consequence, wage dispersion was much lower than in
the FRG. While the empirical evidence on the GDR wage structure has established
positive returns to education of 4.5 to 7.7 log points for one year of schooling, age-
earnings and seniority-earnings profiles - despite the existence of loyalty premiums
- have been suggested to be much flatter than in the FRG. Using retrospective in-
formation for 1989 from the German Socio-Economic-Panel, Bird et al. (1994) and
Krueger and Pischke (1995) estimate returns to experience of about one to two log
points for the first year of experience (compared with about 3.4 to 4.1 log points in
the FRG).
2.2 The Eastern German Labour Market after Unification
After Unification the Eastern German labour market underwent a period of dra-
matic structural change. Monetary union between Eastern and Western Germany
took place on June 30, 1990. With monetary union, Eastern Germany adopted the
legal and economic system from Western Germany, including also its labour mar-
ket institutions. As a result, Western German trade unions quite rapidly succeeded
in transferring the Western German system of collective bargaining to the East.
While the first round of wage negotiations, which already took place during sum-
mer 1990, mainly resulted in lump-sum wage increases, the second round in winter
1990/91 stipulated wage schedules being tied to a fixed proportion of the western
level (Krueger and Pischke, 1995). This gave rise to tremendous wage increases,
which were particularly large within the first year following monetary union. Ac-
cording to Hunt (2001), monthly real wages rose on average by 20 log points between
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1990 and 1991, with the lower educated benefitting to a significantly larger extent
(compare also the similar figures reported by Krueger and Pischke, 1995). For the
time period between 1991 and 1996, Hunt (2001) reports an annual monthly wage
growth of about nine log points, yielding a cumulative average real monthly wage
growth of 78 per cent over the period between 1990 and 1996. Later studies report
that real wage growth in Eastern Germany has come to a halt in the mid-1990s
(Franz and Steiner, 2000) and even started to decline in the first years of the 21st
century (Aretz, 2013). This presumably reflects that since the mid 1990s unions
increasingly lost importance, as most employers could not afford the initial wage
increases. While union membership rates dropped from about 40 per cent in 1992
to about 18 per cent in 2004 (Addison et al., 2007), the proportion of employees
subject to an industry-level contract declined from 56 per cent in 1996 to 41 per
cent in 2004.2
At the same time, many Eastern German technologies became obsolete during
the transition process. After Unification, Eastern Germany experienced massive
inflows of capital and technology from Western Germany. On July 1, 1990 the
’Treuhand’ as a holding company for the state-owned sector was set up with the
primary purpose to sell all of its holdings. When the Treuhand closed down at the
end of 1994, about 860 enterprises had been sold to foreign investors and 3,000 had
been acquired through management buy-outs (Kettenacker, 2013). The privatisa-
tion process not only resulted in massive worker flows across industries, but was
also visible within industries. On the intra-sectoral level, East German firms made
intensive use of short-time work (”Kurzarbeit”) as an instrument provided by the
government to adjust to the economic downturn right after Unification. In 1991,
more than 2 million workers in East Germany were subject to short-time work and
this instrument was especially used in manufacturing (60%), agriculture (15%) and
in the water, energy and mining industry (5%), whereas construction, trade, trans-
port and communication were characterised by relatively stable employment during
2Own calculations from the IAB-Establishment Panel. Representative data on collective bar-
gaining coverage in Eastern Germany are available only since 1996.
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the first phase of the restructuring process.
The massive structural change brought about by the privatisation process has led
some researchers to inquire into whether human capital accumulated during the old
regime became obsolete in the post-unification labour market. Using data from the
1990 German Socio-Economic Panel retrospective GDR survey, Gathmann (2004)
finds that returns to pre-unification accumulated work experience drop to zero after
Unification. The author interprets her results as evidence of a full obsolescence
of socialist work experience, suggesting a full depreciation of job-specific human
capital. Contrary to that finding, Fuchs–Schu¨ndeln and Izem (2012) demonstrate
that the low labour productivity in Eastern Germany can mainly be attributed to
less favourable job characteristics rather than to individual skills.3 The authors
conclude from their findings that a large part of Eastern Germans’ human capital
accumulated during the socialist regime was transferable to the post-unification
labour market and, therefore, should have been of general nature.
3 Data and Sample
The data used in the empirical analysis are taken from German register data (BASiD).
The data combine information from the German Pension Register with various data
sources from the German Federal Employment Agency. The scientific use file of the
data (BASiD-SUF) is a stratified random 0.25% sample of all birth cohorts from
1940 to 1977, who have at least one entry in their social security records, leading
to an overall sample of about 60,000 individuals. The sample has been drawn in a
disproportionate manner and can be made representative using a weighting factor
that is part of the data set (for a detailed description see Hochfellner et al., 2012
and Bo¨nke, 2009).4
3This finding is derived from regional unemployment differences at the inner German border,
based on the argument that, if mainly worker characteristics caused the low labour productivity,
unemployment rates should jump up discontinuously at the former border.
4Note that the representativeness of the data based upon the sample weights that are provided
in the data refer only to the calendar year 2007. Later on, in our analysis, we will use administrative
population data to construct weights for each gender-year cell.
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The data provides longitudinal information on individuals’ entire pension-relevant
biographies up to the year 2007. Individual work histories cover the period from the
year individuals were aged 14 until the age of 67. In Germany, statutory pension
insurance is mandatory for all employees in the private and public sector, with the
exception of civil servants and self-employed individuals. In addition, contributions
to the pension insurance are paid by the unemployment or health insurance during
periods of unemployment and prolonged illness.
The BASiD data provide an ideal basis for analysing the impact of former GDR
citizens’ low-pay status on their later career outcomes for several reasons. First, it
is the only German administrative data source that encompasses full employment
biographies. In particular, the Pension Register contains information on all periods
for which contributions were paid (employment, long-term illness, unemployment)
as well as periods without contributions, which were still creditable for the pension
insurance. The latter refers to activities for which an individual receives pension
credits, such as periods of school or university attendance after the age of 16, periods
of training and apprenticeship and periods of caring.
Second, the BASiD data is the only individual level data set that contains em-
ployment biographies of former GDR citizens before German Unification. After
Unification, former GDR citizens became entitled to transfer their pension-relevant
activities to the FRG pension insurance system. For this purpose, the FRG Pen-
sion Insurance recorded all periods prior to Unification which were creditable for
the pension insurance (see above) as well as earnings up to the GDR social security
cap. The pension data therefore allow us to track former GDR workers’ entire pre-
and post-unification employment histories up to the year 2007. Apart from the in-
dividual information on pension relevant activities, the Pension Register provides
information on age and gender.
Starting from 1975 in Western and from 1992 in Eastern Germany, employment
spells subject to social security contributions from the Pension Register can be
merged with data from the German Federal Employment Agency, the Integrated
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Labour Market Biographies and the Establishment History Panel. The Integrated
Labour Market Biographies provide further time varying individual information on
blue or white-collar status, occupational status, educational status (six categories)
and an establishment identifier. The latter allows us to retrieve information on
tenure at the current employer. Finally, the Establishment History Panel contains
information on the establishment’s workforce composition, establishment size as
well as sector affiliation. Tables B.1 and B.2 in the appendix provide more detailed
descriptions on the variables gained from the Pension Register and Employment
Statistics Register. For former GDR citizens the data lacks explicit information
on education prior to 1992. We therefore impute the educational status by using
information from the Pension Register on individuals’ creditable schooling and ap-
prenticeship periods (for detailed information see Gu¨rtzgen and Nolte, 2016).5
In our analysis the main outcome variable of interest is labour earnings, which
can be calculated by exploiting information on monthly pension credit points gained
from social security employment. Credit points derived from earnings in Eastern
Germany before and after Unification are scaled-up to meet the Western pension
level according to a factor stipulated in the German Social Act (SGB VI). To obtain
the original credit points, Eastern credit points reported in the data have to be
divided by this factor. One credit point corresponds to the average of annual earnings
of all gainfully employed workers in Germany. This implies that monthly earnings
can be obtained by multiplying monthly credit points with average earnings as
documented in the German Social Act (SGB VI - see Table B.2). Earnings are top-
coded at the social security contribution limit. Compared with the FRG, where the
earnings cap increases over time, the GDR threshold remained constant at 600 Mark
throughout the entire GDR period. Due to this unchanged earnings cap, the fraction
of GDR workers with top-coded earnings increased substantially over time and was
much larger than the corresponding fraction in the FRG. Despite the restrictive
earnings information, the data is still suited to analyse low-pay transitions as the
5More specifically, we adopt Imputation Procedure 2 (IMP2 ), which aims to match three
education categories (low, medium, high-skilled), into which the six categories in the IEB have
been typically summarised in many empirical applications.
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earnings information allows us to dichotomise the GDR earnings distribution into a
low- and high-wage sector.
For our empirical analysis, we focus on the employment biographies of former
GDR citizens. Given that our data covers the cohorts 1940-1977, we confine our
sample to the cohorts between 1940 to 1960 and follow their employment histories
starting from the year 1980 until 1999. Focussing on these cohorts enables us to track
the pre- and post-unification labour market histories of individuals aged between 30
and 50 in 1990. As the employment histories of later cohorts (i.e. those born
after 1960) can be observed only after 1980, the restriction to the birth cohorts
1940 to 1960 permits us to observe a reasonable amount of pre-unification labour
market years for all cohorts.6 This is crucial for our empirical strategy, which will
use information on pre-unification labour market histories as a key ingredient in
explaining post-unification labour market outcomes. The BASiD-SUF file provides
monthly information on individuals’ pension credit points as well as their main
labour market state in a given month. We follow the literature and use the labour
market state in July of any given year.7 To smooth out seasonal variation in earnings,
monthly labour earnings are aggregated to the year level by adding up monthly
earnings in a given year and taking the average over the year.8 Given that our data
lacks explicit information on working time, we are not able to convert monthly into
hourly wages. To avoid measuring persistence in working time decisions instead of
earnings, we therefore exclude those individuals who based on the information from
the Employment Statistics Register worked part-time at least once after Unification.9
6The cohort structure of our data implies that the earliest period in which we observe insured
individuals is the year 1954, when those born in 1940 were 14 years old. During the subsequent
years younger cohorts successively enter the data set, which gives rise to an increasingly mixed
age structure. An overview on the age-year structure of the pension sub-part is given by Bo¨nke
et al. (2010). To ensure representativeness within the selected cohorts in terms of the working-age
population’s age structure, we have constructed weights based upon administrative population
data from the German Federal Statistical Office.
7In the data set July 1990 is the first month when wages are fully reported.
8We exclude individuals from the wage distribution if their monthly wages fall short of 150
Mark, as this is considered as unreasonably low. This causes the exclusion of 35 men and 90 women
in total.
9The Employment Statistics Register is available from 1992 onwards. We do not observe
full-time and part-time decisions before 1992. By excluding individuals with at least one part-
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Table 1 shows the number of individuals over the whole sample period. Overall,
Table 1: Number of Individuals in the Sample in each Year 1980-1999
Year Number of Individuals West Migration (#) Retire (#)
1980 4818
1981 4790 28 0
1982 4770 20 0
1983 4761 8 1
1984 4749 9 3
1985 4733 15 1
1986 4723 9 1
1987 4711 10 2
1988 4697 11 3
1989 4683 12 2
1990 4609 71 3
1991 4442 163 4
1992 4284 145 13
1993 4178 105 1
1994 4048 129 1
1995 3949 97 2
1996 3850 94 5
1997 3775 70 5
1998 3694 76 5
1999 3495 192 7
Source: BASiD 2007.
our sample selection yields an unbalanced panel with 4,818 individuals and 87,671
person-year observations. The main reason for panel attrition is migration from
Eastern to Western Germany. While the share of migrants was rather negligible
prior to Unification, the fraction of migrants increased to about 3.1 per cent in the
first two years after Unification. The observed decline afterwards and the increase
in the second half of the 1990s - also referred to as the second wave of migration -
is consistent with what has been documented in the literature (for example Fuchs–
Schu¨ndeln and Schu¨ndeln, 2009). The last column refers to early retirement as a
time spell after 1991, we rely on the assumption that people who had a preference for part-time
employment after 1991 had also been likely to work part-time prior to Unification. Moreover, it is
well established that employment participation rates in communist regimes are generally high also
among females. The Socialist Unity Party (SED) defined not the family but rather the socialistic
work collectives as the basis of society. This resulted in labour participation rates (year 1989)
among females of more then 90%.
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reason for panel attrition, with a relatively strong increase in 1990 and 1991 hinting
to a potentially selective process.
Table 2 summarises the main variables and provides summary statistics for both
time periods prior to the transition (Pre: 1980-1989) and during and after the
transition (Post: 1990-1999). Given that we define low-wage workers as those from
the first decile of the wage distribution, the fraction of low-wage workers is ten per
cent. After economic transition, we are also able to calculate a low-wage threshold
based on a fraction of the median wage. By using two-thirds of the median the table
shows only a slightly higher fraction of low-wage workers. As regards to qualification,
about 14 per cent in the sample did not receive any formal degree, while about
two thirds are medium-skilled and obtained some sort of vocational training. As
mentioned above, entry to higher levels of qualification was extremely constrained
prior to Unification, resulting into a small fraction of ten per cent holding a university
degree. The educational information for the remaining eight per cent is missing.
Using information on occupational status from the first available year from the
Employment Statistics Register, about 50 per cent are blue-collar and 40 to 44 per
cent are white-collar workers. Differentiating the occupational status into skilled,
medium-skilled and simple occupations, about 14-17 per cent of individuals belong
to the first, 48-55 per cent to the second and about one third to the final category.
Given the increasing fraction of un- and non-employed individuals after Unification,
the evolution of experience and age can be observed to diverge after Unification.
Finally, the last two rows show the number of employment interruptions and the
accumulated length of employment interruptions measured in months, which both
increased by construction after Unification.
13
Table 2: Variable Definition and Description of Basic Variables
Variables Description Mean Standard Deviation
Pre Post Pre Post
Variables over the period 1980-1999
Low-wage Indicator (1=Low-wage), p10 0.10 0.10 0.30 0.30
Low-wage Indicator (1=Low-wage), 2/3 median - 0.13 - 0.34
Un- and non-employed Indicator (1=Not working) 0.03 0.16 0.22 0.42
Migrate Indicator (1=Migrate) 0.001 0.02 0.03 0.14
Age Age in years 34.7 44.5 6.58 6.54
Female Indicator (1=Female) 0.53 0.52 0.50 0.50
Education
Low-skilled No formal degree 0.14 0.13 0.34 0.33
Medium-skilled Apprenticeship 0.69 0.69 0.47 0.47
High-skilled University 0.09 0.10 0.31 0.31
Occupational status∗
White-collar White-collar worker 0.39 0.44 0.49 0.49
Blue-collar Blue-collar worker 0.48 0.50 0.50 0.50
Skilled occupation Engineer, professional, manager 0.14 0.17 0.36 0.38
Medium-skilled occupation Qualified manual, service, commercial 0.55 0.48 0.36 0.38
Simple occupation Simple manual, service, commercial 0.31 0.35 0.34 0.47
Labour market characteristics
Experience Years worked 14.5 23.4 6.96 7.23
# Interruptions Number of interruptions 3.10 5.01 3.15 4.24
Interruption length Cum. length of interruptions (in months) 14.7 23.3 23.5 31.3
Source: BASiD 2007.
Notes: ∗Information for occupational status (white- and blue-collar) and the occupational groups are imputed for the pre-unification period based on information from
the first available year from the Employment Statistics Register.
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4 Descriptive Statistics
4.1 Wage Information before Unification and the Definition
of the Low-Wage Threshold
Regarding wage information prior to Unification, wages until the first half of 1990
were censored above at 600 Mark. Figure 1 illustrates the pre-unification wage
distribution (separately for male and female workers) for 1980 and 1989, respectively.
The figure also marks the first deciles in relation to the censoring limit. It shows that
Wage distribution, male, 1980
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Wage distribution, male, 1989
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Wage distribution, female, 1980
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Figure 1: Distribution of Wages between 1980-1989, by Gender
the fraction of individuals earning monthly wages below 600 Mark decreased over
time. The lower panel illustrates that the first decile for males increased only slightly
between 1980 and 1989, whereas for females it grew from about 370 Mark in 1980 to
15
530 Mark in 1989. The figures show that due to the large extent of censoring in our
data we are only capable of fully observing the lower part of the wage distribution.
To measure individuals’ relative economic position, we will exploit this information
to measure the incidence and duration of individuals’ position in the bottom part
of the pre-unification wage distribution. Note that because our analysis focuses on
birth cohorts from 1940 to 1960, the relative position needs to be interpreted in
relation to this specific sub-population. In accordance with the literature on low
pay, individuals are defined as being ”low paid” if their wage does not exceed a
specified threshold. Previous studies have used different definitions of the low-pay
threshold, such as lower quantiles of the wage distribution (Cappellari, 2002 and
Cappellari, 2007) or alternatively some fixed proportion of a quantile, such as two
thirds of the median wage (Cappellari and Jenkins, 2008 and Uhlendorff, 2006).
Given that in 1989, especially among male workers, only a small fraction earned less
than the social security contribution limit of 600 Mark, we therefore have to adopt
a somewhat more restrictive definition of low pay by fixing the low-pay threshold at
the first decile of the wage distribution.10
Figure 1 shows that shortly before Unification the first deciles approach the
censoring limit of 600 Mark. A particular concern is therefore that measurement
error due to underreporting might misclassify a certain fraction of individuals as
falling below the censoring limit. Even though we cannot fully rule out such kind
of measurement error, we argue that there are at least two reasons speaking against
it. First, if measurement error due to underreporting played a significant role, this
should lead to a downward biased estimate of the first decile of the monthly wage
distribution. To check whether this is the case, we compare the decile obtained
from our data set with figures from external data sources. An ideal candidate data
set is the German Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP), whose retrospective survey in
1990 provides representative and uncensored information on former GDR workers’
monthly labour earnings for the year 1989. According to the GSOEP, the first decile
10Appendix D in the online publication provides robustness checks based on the wage distribu-
tion pooled for males and females. This has the advantage that the first decile threshold becomes
farther away from the 600 Mark censoring limit.
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of monthly wages was about 560 Mark in 1989, whose order of magnitude is broadly
in line with our pooled figure of 550 Mark.11 A second reason speaking against
underreporting stems from the administrative nature of the pension data. Central
to this argument is the view that earnings dependent pension entitlements should
create large incentives to correctly report (or at least not to underreport) earnings.
In Appendix C, we demonstrate that even though GDR pension entitlements were
only to a limited extent earnings dependent, monthly earnings which fell into a
small earnings interval (between 500 and 600 Mark - depending on the number
of creditable pension years) effectively raised pension entitlements. This yields an
argument against a systematic measurement error due to underreporting, especially
within this interval.
Apart from measurement error, another crucial issue concerns the interpretation
of our low-pay threshold in terms of real consumption possibilities. Krueger and
Pischke (1995) argue that due to the subsidisation of necessities, low paid individuals
in a centrally planned economy were relatively better off than comparable individuals
in a market economy. Given that individuals at the lower end of the earnings
distribution spend a larger fraction of income on subsidised goods, the real earnings
distribution should have been therefore more compressed than the nominal one.
This raises the question as to whether earnings below our low-pay threshold also
reflect economic deprivation in terms of real consumption possibilities. A tentative
answer to this question may be provided based on measures of absolute poverty in
the GDR. Manz (1992) derives such a measure by defining a minimum consumption
level as the poverty threshold. Based on data on the consumption price level from
the GDR Statistical Office, the author estimates the nominal value of this minimum
consumption basket for a single household to amount to approximately 350 Mark in
1972 and 550 Mark in 1988. However, it needs to be stressed that these results have
to be interpreted with caution as the data sources for the underlying consumption
basket are lacking in this study.
11Source: German Socioeconomic Panel, own calculations. The figure is obtained by pooling
male and female working age individuals with positive earnings, after excluding apprentices, civil
servants and the self-employed.
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4.2 Unconditional Probabilities
In order to validate the data internally, Table 3 provides unconditional estimates of
being low paid based on individual characteristics, separately for males and females.
Several results stand out here: First, the raw unconditional probability of being low
paid decreases with skills. For males, this decline is somewhat stronger during the
post-unification period. Second, while younger individuals are slightly more likely
to be low paid than older ones, there appear to be no large differences across both
periods. Third, blue-collar workers and those with simple occupations have larger
Table 3: Unconditional probabilities, by Gender and Period
First Decile 2/3 Median
Males Females Males Females
Pre Post Pre Post Post Post
Low-wage 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 7.1 19.3
Education
Low-skilled 12.4 15.3 11.7 11.0 10.2 21.9
Medium-skilled 10.4 10.1 10.4 10.9 7.3 20.1
High-skilled 5.4 2.5 3.0 2.7 2.1 4.8
Age groups
20-29 12.9 - 9.7 - - -
30-39 9.7 11.4 10.3 10.7 7.2 18.5
40-49 8.8 9.0 9.4 9.6 6.7 17.8
50-59 - 10.6 - 9.1 8.2 19.2
Occupation
White-collar 6.2 3.4 7.9 5.2 2.7 10.4
Blue-collar 11.3 12.5 8.3 15.7 8.8 30.6
Skilled occupation 5.3 2.0 4.5 1.6 1.4 4.0
Medium-skilled occupation 10.9 9.8 11.4 9.5 7.2 17.0
Simple occupation 10.8 13.3 9.7 15.2 9.4 29.8
Labour market history
Experience
> 20 years 9.2 9.6 6.9 8.9 7.0 17.7
≤ 20 years 10.4 10.4 11.0 10.8 7.3 19.2
# Interruptions
> 5 times 20.7 14.2 9.7 9.7 10.3 20.0
≤ 5 times 9.5 9.2 10.1 9.5 6.7 17.1
Length Interruptions
> 20 months 21.8 31.0 13.2 11.2 27.4 22.2
≤ 20 months 10.0 8.7 7.3 7.3 6.1 13.7
Source: BASiD 2007, weighted sample
Notes: Pooled weighted data for the years 1980-1999. Left numbers (Prior) are probabilities
prior to Unification. Right numbers (Post) refer to probabilities after Unification.
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low-pay probabilities, with the differences between occupations becoming slightly
more pronounced during the post-unification period. Finally, as to the importance
of the labour market history, the probability of being low paid decreases with ex-
perience and increases with the number and cumulative length of labour market
interruptions.
For completeness, the last column shows probability estimates based on the
more conventional low-wage threshold of two-thirds of the median. Due to data
availability the figures refer to the post-unification period. While the overall pattern
of results remains unchanged, the magnitude of the differences becomes somewhat
more pronounced.
4.3 Labour Market Transitions
To calculate labour market transitions we compute the extent of aggregate state
dependence (ASD), defined as the difference in the probabilities of low pay condi-
tional on being initially low paid and highly-paid in period t − 1. Thus, ASD is
defined as:
ASD = P (Lt = 1|Lt−1 = 1)− P (Lt = 1|Lt−1 = 0), (1)
with Lt = 1 and Lt = 0 meaning low and high pay in year t, respectively. To
describe the evolution of low-wage persistence, Figure 2 plots ASD against time.
Distinguishing the pre-unification (to the left of the grey bar), the transition (be-
tween the vertical lines) and the post-unification period (i.e. the time after monetary
union), several noteworthy facts emerge from Figure 2. During the pre-transition
period, aggregate state dependence varied around 42 per cent. During transition,
aggregate state dependence decreased markedly by more than 20 percentage points
to 24 per cent in 1990 compared to the pre-unification period. The third part of
the figure (to the right of the grey bar) indicates a sharp rise in low-pay persistence,
with aggregate state dependence increasing from 40 per cent in 1991 to values above
70 per cent in the late 1990s. Figure 3 shows the evolution of aggregate state de-
pendence by gender. The figure reveals that the sharp decline in aggregate state
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Figure 2: Aggregate State Dependence
dependence during transition is mostly accounted for by female workers. After Uni-
fication, there appears to be a strong convergence between male and female workers.
Finally, Figure A.1 in the appendix reports the gender-specific evolution of aggre-
gate state dependence based on the pooled wage distribution. Compared to Figure
3, the observed minimum in aggregate state dependence during transition becomes
somewhat more pronounced for males.
The overall picture that emerges from Figure 2 along with Figure 3 and Figure
A.1 is that aggregate state dependence plummeted with the beginning of a market-
orientated economy. The post-unification period is characterised by a steady rise
in low-pay persistence during the first years and is facing a level-off at the end
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Figure 3: Aggregate State Dependence, by Gender
of the 1990s. Overall, the figures show that the importance of previous low-wage
employment for low-pay in the current period reaches its minimum during the time
of transition, albeit less pronounced for male workers.
5 Econometric Approach
5.1 Short-run Dynamics within and across Political Regimes
The descriptive figures from the previous sections may hide potential compositional
effects and do not allow us to infer any conclusions about the extent of the causal
effect of the previous low-pay status. In what follows, we will therefore attempt to
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isolate persistence in low-pay due to observed and unobserved heterogeneity from
genuine state dependence. The latter basically measures to what extent low-wage
employment today causes low-wage employment in the future. We will start the
econometric analysis by setting up a joint model of low pay over the whole sample
period. This may provide important insights into the relevance of observed and
unobserved factors and the difference in the estimated parameters across the different
regimes. To quantify the importance of observables and unobservables, we specify
the following baseline model of low-pay employment:
y∗it = (γ + δHτt)yit−1 + x
′
itβ + i + uit (2)
yit = I(y
∗
it ≥ 0) (3)
where xit are the explanatory variables presented in Table 2, i is an individual-
specific random effect and yit−1 denotes the low-wage status in t − 1. We further
assume uit to be an idiosyncratic error term with uit ∼ N(0, 1).12 To allow for a
change in short-run persistence across the pre- and post-unification period (FRG),
we further interact the lagged endogenous variable yit−1 with a period dummy vari-
able Hτt, where Hτt = 1 iff t ≥ τ and τ = 1990. The model includes as time-varying
explanatory variables the number of labour market interruptions, cumulated labour
market interruptions measured in months and a set of experience dummy variables.
We additionally include a lagged non-employment indicator variable.
Estimating the dynamic random effects model without modelling the initial con-
dition will bias the estimation results of the coefficients (see for example Heckman,
1981b, Stewart and Swaffield, 1999, Honore´ and Kyriazidou, 2000, Arulampalam
et al., 2000). The dynamic structure of the model implies that individual i’s labour
12This approach does not take into account the state of not working in period t. Note, however,
that the necessity of modelling selection out of employment differs across the regimes. Prior to
Unification, the right and duty to work caused only few individuals to stay non-employed, indicating
that selection out of employment is less of a concern. This is true especially for males. In our
sample 85 per cent among male workers did never experience a non-employment spell between
1980 and 1989 and 95 per cent experienced no or one year of non-employment. Among females,
the numbers are 70 per cent and 85 per cent, respectively.
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market position in period 1 depends on status in period 0 (Heckman, 1981a). Given
the endogeneity of the first period’s outcome due to a correlation with the time-
invariant individual effect (selection), state dependence is likely to be overestimated
(see Chay and Hyslop, 1998).
In order to treat the initial condition, we follow Wooldridge (2005) and model the
density of yit for all t = 1, ..., T given covariates xit, start at t = 2 and condition the
density of yit for t = 2, ..., T on yi1 and xit. This approach is comparable to the cor-
related random-effects model put forward by Chamberlain (1984) (see also Prowse,
2012).13 To account for a potential correlation of the unobserved individual effect
with observed explanatory variables, we follow Mundlak (1978) and Chamberlain
(1984) and model the individual effect, i, as:
i = a1yi1 + a2x¯i + αi (4)
where x¯ presents individual time averages of all time varying variables, yi1 is the
initial low-wage status in the first period and αi ∼ N(0, σ2α).14
In general, the assumptions made in the specified baseline model (equation 2
to 4) of a constant random effect αi and β’s over time might be too strong. To
provide an example for αi, one may think about one’s political attitude (e.g. civil
rights campaigner) that might increase the probability of being at the bottom of
the wage distribution. This effect might reverse or at least change after Unification.
Moreover, the unconditional probability estimates (Table 3) indicate a change in
the estimated β-coefficients. Therefore, we estimate a bunch of models that allow
sequentially for a change in the coefficients after Unification. We start with the
baseline model (equation 2) where β and αi are held constant across time. Model
13Another approach developed by Heckman (1981b) models the joint distribution for the entire
sample (t = 1, ..., T ) of an individual’s current status. This estimator is, for example, used by
Arulampalam and Stewart (2009) and involves the specification of an equation for the initial
condition.
14As shown by Akay (2012) using Monte Carlo results, both estimators (Heckman and
Wooldridge) tend to perform similarly in long panels (above six time periods), with the Heck-
man approach producing less biased results for a small T -dimension.
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Table 4: Modelling Approach
Model observed heterogeneity unobserved heterogeneity
Baseline model β constant αi constant
Model 1 β variable αi constant
Model 2 β constant αi variable
Model 3 β variable αi variable
Notes: The models are specified over the time periods between 1980 and 1999. All models in
the random effects specification account for the initial condition using the Wooldridge approach
and follow the literature using the Mundlak-Chamberlain device. Model 2 and 3 are estimated
by simulation using 100 Halton draws.
1 allows additionally for a change in β after Unification while αi remains constant.
In model 2, we allow for a change in αi holding β constant. Model 3 sets up the
process of low pay over the whole period by allowing both coefficients to change
after Unification. The baseline model and model 1 are estimated using quadrature
methods whereas the last two models are estimated by simulated maximum like-
lihood using 100 Halton draws. This sequential estimation approach allows us to
learn about regime effects and the importance of confounding factors for the two
different regimes.
Results. To quantify the importance of observables and unobservables, we esti-
mate the average partial effect (APE) for each of the time periods considered. The
method used is based on counterfactual outcome probabilities based on the lagged
endogenous variable. Following Papke and Wooldridge (2008), the specified average
structural function (ASF) for period t can be written as:
ASFt = N
−1
N∑
i=1
Φ[(γˆ + δˆHτt)yit−1 + x′itβˆ + aˆ0 + aˆ1xi + aˆ2yi1)(1 + σˆ
2
α)
−1/2] (5)
for t = 1981− 1999. This function corresponds to state dependence accounting for
observables and unobservables. By setting yit−1 = 1 and subtracting the function
value for yit−1 = 0, we get the average partial effect of being in low-wage employment
at time t for individuals being low paid in t-1 compared to high-paid individuals in
t-1. Tables 5 and 6 report the results for the defined periods (GDR, FRG). The first
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table reports average partial effects without modelling unobserved heterogeneity.
The aggregate effects are taken from Figure 3, averaged over the two time periods.
We first observe that after accounting for observed heterogeneity (β constant), state
Table 5: Average Partial Effects of Pooled Probit Models, by Gender and Period
Aggregate β constant β variable
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b)
Males Females Males Females Males Females
P (yt = 1|yt−1 = 1)− P (yt = 1|yt−1 = 0)
APEGDR 14.1 69.3 10.8 64.7 10.2 64.9
APEFRG 58.3 70.4 48.4 61.3 46.7 59.1
Source: BASiD 2007, weighted sample.
Notes: The table reports the results from dynamic discrete choice probit models on the
probability of being low paid. yt = 1 denotes the low-wage status. All estimated average
partial effects are significant at the 5% level using 100 bootstrapped replications. Each
regression for the male (female) sample has 35847 (36178) observations with 2248 (2540)
individuals. Detailed results on estimated coefficients are shown in our online appendix.
dependence declines for both males and females during both periods. However, the
decline is rather small, suggesting that low-pay persistence is largely independent
of differences in observables that are available in our data set. Allowing the β-
coefficients to change after Unification reduces the point estimates of the average
partial effects only slightly.
Table 6 shows the results based on the random effects specifications. The baseline
specification (β and αi constant) shows a reduction in estimated state dependence
for all time periods compared to the pooled model. However, the decline in state
dependence in absolute terms compared to the pooled probit model (Table 5, model
2a-2b) is most pronounced for the pre-unification period. A concern with the re-
sulting APEFRG is that it does not account for selection out of employment after
Unification. This selection process is less of a concern during GDR because of the
right and the duty to work. After Unification, state dependence for male workers
increases substantially compared to the pre-unification period whereas for female
workers the change is not significant. The lower part of the table reports the esti-
mates of the random effects’ variances. The variance of the random effect is higher
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Table 6: Average Partial Effects of Random Effect Probit Models, by Gender and
Period
β constant β variable β constant β variable β variable
αi constant αi constant αi variable αi variable αi variable
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b) (4a) (4b) (5a) (5b)
Males Females Males Females Males Females Males Females Males Females
P (yt = 1|yt−1 = 1)− P (yt = 1|yt−1 = 0)
APEGDR 4.7 37.8 4.2 37.4 4.9 41.6 4.9 41.9 4.9 41.6
APEFRG 39.9 38.5 37.2 36.2 37.5 46.6 34.8 45.2 34.8 39.4
Random Effects
σ2 0.111 0.302 0.117 0.315
σ2GDR 0.201 0.519 0.189 0.480 0.189 0.494
σ2FRG 0.703 0.624 0.668 0.638 0.666 0.872
σGDR,FRG -0.009
† 0.305
Source: BASiD 2007, weighted sample.
Notes: The table reports the results from dynamic discrete choice probit models on the probability of being low
paid. yt = 1 denotes the low-wage status. All estimated average partial effects and variance estimates (†apart
from the covariance estimate for male workers) are significant at the 5% level using 100 bootstrapped replications.
Each regression for the male (female) sample has 35847 (36178) observations with 2248 (2540) individuals. Detailed
results on estimated coefficients are shown in an online appendix.
for female workers indicating a more heterogeneous group. Model 2a-2b allows for a
change in all β-coefficients after Unification but assuming again a constant random
effect. Similar to the results in Table 5, changing β has only modest effects on the
average partial effects. Compared to the first specification of the same table (model
1a-1b), the reduction in state dependence after Unification is between about two to
three percentage points. The next three models allow for a change in the random
effects after Unification. In all specifications, the variance increases stronger for the
period after Unification. This might be an indication of offsetting forces within the
different economic environments that drive down the variances under the constancy
restriction. Put differently, the results suggest that there are unobservable factors in
place that increase the probability of being low paid in one regime and change their
character after the systemic transformation. While models (3) and (4) restrict the
correlation between regime-specific unobservables to be zero, model (5) allows for a
covariance term between the two random effects. For male workers the covariance
is virtually zero and not significant, whereas for female workers unobservables that
determine the stochastic low-wage process in the GDR are partly also of relevance
in the new regime.
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From the approach so far, we observe that unobserved heterogeneity is the driv-
ing force and that it appears to be regime-specific. Compositional effects based on
observable characteristics are less important in explaining state dependence. The
analysis, however, fails to account for selection out of employment. This is of con-
siderable importance for the post-unification period and might lead to an upward
bias of the estimated average partial effect, APEFRG, if low-wage individuals were
more likely to experience a transition into non-employment. Moreover, the analysis
only sheds light on short-run within-regime dependence. In what follows, we will
focus on economic dependence across the different regimes by adopting an empirical
strategy that addresses these issues.
5.2 Selection, Long-run Effects and Heterogeneous Short-
run Dynamics after Unification
The main purpose now is to model the selection mechanism out of employment after
Unification that will otherwise bias the estimation results of the short-run measures
of state dependence and to estimate across-regime effects of low-wage employment.
The multivariate analysis using a bivariate random effect model has shown that the
random effects are regime-specific. Given that the institutional setting (socialism,
market-economy) changes at the time of Unification we will start the analysis in
1990, the first year after the fall of the Berlin Wall, and model the stochastic process
of low pay until 1999. This enables us to model a constant random effect and to
account for selection within the new regime. A further important advantage of
this strategy is that it allows us to analyse long-run across-regime state dependence
and to use detailed variables of firm characteristics in the market economy which is
otherwise not possible due to data availability. Another concern is the chosen low-
wage threshold of the first decile. Focussing on the post-unification period enables
us to measure the low-pay outcome by adopting the more conventional measure of
two-thirds of the median. Our econometric model becomes:
y∗ikt = γkyit−1 + x
′
itβk + ϑikt (6)
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y∗ik1 = x
′
i1βk + ϑik1, (7)
where y∗ikt is a latent unobservable variable measuring the propensity of earning
a high wage (k = 0), a low wage (k = 1) or being non-employed (k = 2) for
individual i in year t for t > 1. Similar to the model above, the propensity is a
function of an individual’s previous state, yit−1, individual characteristics, xit, as
well as unobserved characteristics, ϑikt. y
∗
ik1 refers to the initial process. We further
assume the unobserved part ϑikt to consist of an individual and state specific random
component, ik, which is assumed to be time-invariant and uncorrelated with all x-
variables at every point in time, and a time-variant idiosyncratic component, uikt,
i.e. ϑikt = ik + uikt. By making distributional assumptions about uikt, we follow
the literature and assume a type I extreme value distribution. For identification we
set the state of high-wage employment as the reference state.
Our approach to analyse across-regime dependence is twofold. The first issue
concerns the modelling of the initial condition. Given that we start directly at the
time of Unification, the initial condition is supposed to be determined by conditions
in 1990. The motivation of modelling the initial condition is generally to account
for selection in the first period. As a result, its significance may help us to assess the
randomness of the initial allocation to the low-wage sector during transition. Usu-
ally, a (positive) significant value of the respective coefficient would indicate that
the start of the modelled stochastic process is correlated with unobservables govern-
ing low-pay after Unification. Therefore, if the coefficient on the initial condition
is insignificant, the allocation of individuals to the low-wage sector in 1990 may be
considered close to random in terms of market-regime unobservables.
Second, the data situation allows us to estimate effects of pre-unification low-
wage experience on post-unification low-wage propensities. As a first measure of
pre-unification low-wage experience we count the years an individual was below the
first decile between 1980 and 1989. In our sample there are 1074 (49 per cent) male
and 637 (27 per cent) female workers who spent at least one year below the first
wage decile during 1980 and 1989. From those individuals, 90 per cent of males
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and 66 per cent of females had between one to three years of low-wage experience.
Table 7 reports the descriptive statistics on the probability of being below two-
third of the median over the time period between 1990 and 1999 conditional on
the across-regime variable number of years below the first decile. From the table
Table 7: Percentage of Low-wage Employment Conditional on the Number of Years
below the First Decile before Unification
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Males
low − wage 5.3 7.3 5.4 6.0 7.0 7.3 8.6 8.9 8.8 9.3
low − wage | # low − wage 1− 3 6.0 7.8 5.6 6.3 7.2 7.9 9.3 10.4 9.8 10.1
low − wage | # low − wage > 3 16.3 19.1 16.2 16.4 11.8 9.3 9.7 11.9 16.1 17.4
Females
low − wage 13.9 14.4 14.8 18.6 18.6 18.9 21.4 23.0 25.1 24.8
low − wage | # low − wage 1− 3 23.7 23.4 21.4 27.0 28.3 23.5 28.1 31.3 28.8 30.3
low − wage | # low − wage > 3 48.9 42.2 31.3 40.8 35.5 34.5 40.5 41.4 44.7 41.7
Source: BASiD 2007, weighted statistics.
we first observe that the low-wage sector has been increasing over time for both,
males and females. Experiencing a low wage episode between one and up to three
years during 1980 and 1989 raises the probability of belonging to the low-wage sector
after Unification only slightly for male workers, whereas the difference becomes more
pronounced for females. The probability of being below two-thirds of the median
wage increases further if the number of low-wage years prior to Unification was
above three. For both, males and females, the probability has been increasing at
the end of the sample period. Thus, individuals who were relatively frequently low
paid during the GDR regime are more likely to earn lower wages in a market-based
economy. Given the higher uncertainty about one’s individual productivity due to
weaker signalling potentials, the connection between the low-wage status prior to
and after Unification seems to have decreased first and then started to increase
again. Additionally to this low-wage measure, the data set allows us to construct
employment history measures of labour market interruptions. This includes all kind
of interruptions such as child-care and illness. We calculate the number of non-
employment months between labour market entry and 1989 (see Mosthaf, 2011 for
an empirical strategy to include pre-sample variables into the model).15
15See Appendix B for the possible economic states in the data set. To allow for a flexible
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Accounting for the pre-unification information, our empirical model becomes:
y∗ikt = γkyit−1 + xitβk + Γiϕk + ik + ϑikt (8)
where yikt is the propensity of individual i being in state k at time t with t =
1991 − 1999. As shown in the descriptive analysis, the main labour market states
k are high-wage, low-wage and out-of-employment (including unemployed and non-
employed and referred to as non-employment in the following) with high-wage being
the reference category.16 xit represents the explanatory variables and yit−1 is a vector
of labour market states in t− 1. The individual- and state-specific random effect is
modeled using the Wooldridge approach:
ik = a1kyi,1990 + a2kx¯i + αik (9)
where x¯ presents individual time averages of all time varying variables, yi,1990 is the
initial low-wage status in the first period and αik ∼ N(0,Σα). The cumulative pre-
unification low-pay histories are captured by Γi. Note that consistent identification
of ϕk requires Γi to be uncorrelated with αik. The extent to which this assumption
holds depends on the correlation between the regime-specific unobservables. Our
results from the previous section suggest that the identifying assumption is likely to
be met for males, whereas for females the coefficient may still be upward biased.
Assuming a multivariate normal distribution of the random intercepts leads to
a 2-dimensional integral. We estimate this model by simulation (MSL) using 100
Halton draws.17
dependence we construct labour market interruption intervals that are different for males and
females. Due to institutional settings and socio-cultural norms, male individuals typically exhibit
rather few interruptions. Therefore, the baseline interval for males is zero interruptions. We further
define medium interruptions between one and six months and more than six months to be the high
category. The baseline for females is up to 12 months. The medium category comprises 12 to 48
months and more than 48 months is defined as the high category.
16The out-of-employment state should be interpreted as an absorbing state that might affect
low-wage dynamics. We therefore include the migration decision (see Table 2) into this state to
control for selective migration.
17For a detailed description for MSL properties see for example Gourieroux and Monfort (1993).
Train (2003) discusses illustratively the properties of Halton draws in terms of coverage and effi-
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The importance of firm characteristics for wage mobility is well established in the
literature on low-wage persistence (see Gu¨rtzgen and Heinze, 2016). However, esti-
mating multinomial logit models with different sets of covariates is not common in
the literature. We include therefore firm size dummies, the share of female workers,
the share of low-skilled workers and the median age of the establishment work force
as well as detailed occupational information in the low-wage equation to control for
firm characteristics in the dynamic process.
5.3 Empirical Results
For expositional purposes, we confine the presentation of the results to the main
variables of interest. The upper part of Table 8 shows marginal effects of the lagged
low-wage indicator on the probability of belonging to the low-wage sector. For
male workers (model 1a), the probability of belonging to the low-wage sector is 16.7
percentage points higher if one has been low paid in t− 1. For females (model 1b),
the estimate of true state dependence is with 31.3 percentage points almost twice as
high. The interrelation between non-employment and low-wage employment is also
found to be statistically significant and is in line with the literature. The middle
part of the table shows the results for the initial condition using the Wooldridge
approach. Focussing on the first model, the initial condition is not found to be
significant. The modelled stochastic process of low-wage employment is independent
from the outcome in the first year. This provides first evidence of a random initial
allocation to the low-wage sector in 1990. The lower part of the table shows the
marginal effects of the pre-unification variables (Γi). We do not find any across-
regime effects if the number of years below the first decile in the wage distribution
between 1980 and 1989 is between one and three. However, having more than three
years pre-unification low-pay experience raises the probability of being low paid by
1.1 percentage points for men (albeit insignificantly) and by 3.2 percentage points
for females. The second variable measuring across-regime dependence is the number
of labour market interruptions.
ciency.
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Table 8: Marginal Effects of Multinomial Logit Models with Random Effects, by Gender
Males (1a) Females (1b) Males (2a) Females (2b)
low-wage non-empl. low-wage non-empl. low-wage non-empl. low-wage non-empl.
Short-run dynamics
Low − waget−1 0.167*** 0.079*** 0.313*** 0.078*** 0.145*** 0.033 0.188*** 0.090***
(0.016) (0.020) (0.020) (0.015) (0.014) (0.026) (0.014) (0.022)
Non− employedt−1 0.096*** 0.137*** 0.117*** 0.174*** 0.088*** 0.102*** 0.115*** 0.128***
(0.013) (0.009) (0.012) (0.008) (0.012) (0.008) (0.012) (0.017)
Initial condition
Low − wage1990 0.009 -0.011* 0.003 -0.011 0.020 -0.000 0.014 -0.001
(0.011) (0.006) (0.009) (0.007) (0.014) (0.006) (0.010) (0.007)
Non− employed1990 -0.005 0.000 -0.004 0.012 0.013 -0.009 0.011 0.006
(0.011) (0.006) (0.003) (0.008) (0.016) (0.007) (0.017) (0.008)
Long-run dynamics
# Low-wage years
1− 3 0.003 -0.004 0.006 -0.003 0.004 -0.005 -0.004 -0.002
(0.005) (0.007) (0.012) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.009)
> 3 0.011 0.009 0.032*** 0.006 -0.002 0.010 0.016 0.007
(0.012) (0.006) (0.013) (0.006) (0.013) (0.007) (0.012) (0.006)
# Interruptions†
Medium -0.001 0.003 0.001 0.003 -0.001 0.000 0.001 0.003
(0.013) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
High -0.004 0.004 -0.007 0.006 -0.008 -0.004 0.013 -0.002
(0.011) (0.005) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.011) (0.006)
Controls
√ √ √ √
Occupation
√ √ √ √
Firm charac. x x
√ √
obs. (total) 17542 18011 16312 16465
obs. (ind.) 2181 2289 2165 2267
LogLik -6388.2 -8236.1 -5330.4 -5748.2
Source: BASiD 2007, weighted sample.
Notes: †The reference category differs by gender. For males, the reference is zero labour market interruptions; medium: up
to six months; high: more than six months. For females, the reference is zero to 12 months; medium: 12 to 48 months;
high: more than 48 months. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. All estimations contain a constant, the specified
Mundlak-Chamberlain device, and control for missings in the education variable. Control variables include age dummies,
education dummies, year dummies, regional dummies and experience dummies. The out of work equation includes lagged
dummy variables of white-collar, skilled and simple occupation. Before Unification, the low-wage threshold is the first decile,
while after unification two-thirds of the median is used. The average marginal effects are estimated by averaging over the
average marginal effects of 100 Halton draws. Asterisks next to coefficients indicate significance levels as follows: *** 1%, **
5%, * 10%. Detailed results on estimated coefficients and random effects are shown in the online appendix.
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Interestingly, there is no effect of socialist interruptions on the probability of being
low paid during the first decade after Unification. The last two models in Table 8
include as additional control variables firm characteristics such as firm size, the share
of female and low-skilled workers as well as median age in the low-wage equation. All
variables enter the specifications with their expected sign. The short-run measures
of state dependence are significantly affected once firm characteristics are accounted
for. For male workers, estimated state dependence decreases slightly, whereas for
females the coefficient drops by more than ten percentage points. This points to a
selection into low-wage firms, especially for female workers and shows how important
it is to control for firm characteristics. The coefficients on the variables that mea-
sure across-regime dependence are reduced as well. Having experienced more than
three years pre-unification low-pay increases the probability of being low paid after
Unification for females workers by 1.6 percentage points (with a t-value of 1.45).
Heterogeneity across Time. The results in general do not provide any evidence
of across-regime economic dependence and refer to the whole post-unification pe-
riod. In principle, it might be conceivable that across-regime effects are heterogenous
over time. The same is true for short-run state dependence. Given that individual
restrictions with respect to qualification and occupational choices decreased after
Unification, individuals may have been facing increasing opportunities to acquire
skills in the market economy. Therefore, if persistence was the result of human
capital depreciation, such a catching up process should have resulted in a decline
in state dependence over time. On the other hand, if state dependence was the
result of signalling low productivity levels, high initial uncertainty after Unification
should have rendered the selection into low-wage jobs based on individual produc-
tivity unlikely. To the extent that uncertainty has been declining over time, such
a mechanism should have resulted in an increase in state dependence after Unifi-
cation. According to the short-run measure of state dependence after Unification,
an increasing tendency over time would support the signalling mechanisms. Even
though we cannot rule out the human capital effect, it is rather unlikely that human
capital depreciation strongly changes and cause a rapid increase. Contrarily, catch-
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ing up on the qualification level would work in the opposite direction compared to
Figure 3.
To distinguish the first restructuring phase from further time periods, we esti-
mate a model similar to model 2 of Table 8 including interaction effects for the time
periods 1994-1996 and 1997-1999 for the short- and long-run dynamic variables and
the initial condition. Figure 4 (left) shows the results for the short-run low-pay
dynamics (t-1 ). Over time, short-run persistence increased from about six per cent
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Source: BASiD 2007, weighted sample.
Notes: The figure shows the marginal effects and the corresponding 90% confidence intervals of the probability of
being in low-wage employment conditional on low pay in t-1 using a multinomial logit model with random effects
and firm characteristics for the low-wage state distinguished by time and gender. The left hand figure shows the
marginal effects of being low paid conditional on being low paid in t-1 (equation 8). The right hand figure estimates
the effects separately for the three time periods. The marginal effects are estimated by averaging over 100 Halton
draws. The light grey lines are the estimates from Table 8. Each regression for the male (female) sample (left
and middle figure) has 16312 (16465) observations with 2165 (2267) individuals. Detailed results on estimated
coefficients are shown in the online appendix.
Figure 4: Effect Heterogeneity - Short-run Dynamics
(three per cent) for males (females) in the first period (1991-1993) after Unification
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to 23 per cent (26 per cent) during the last three years of the decade. While all esti-
mates do not significantly differ from the estimates in Table 8 (see light grey lines),
the difference between the first period (1991-1993) and the last period (1997-1999)
is significant for both groups. However, a major concern with this specification is
the potential presence of a dynamic selection process as the pool of low-wage indi-
viduals in the last three years might significantly differ from that in the first three
years. To deal with this issue, the right hand part of the figure shows the results
from running a separate regression for each defined period. It shows for both, males
and females, that the probability of staying low paid is higher for workers who have
already been low paid and that this probability is rather constant over time. This
suggests that the former documented increase in short-run state dependence reflects
a strong selection process after Unification.
To assess the randomness of the initial allocation to the low-wage sector, our pre-
vious results have shown that the initial condition is not significant. This indicates
that the modelled stochastic low-wage process is independent of the low-wage status
in 1990. Given that the lagged endogenous variable is interacted with two period
dummy variables, we also interact the initial condition variable with the same pe-
riod dummies. Table 9 shows the results. The point estimate of the initial condition
for the first period (1991-1993) is slightly more positive compared to Table 8. It
basically supports the findings suggesting that the initial allocation to the low-wage
sector is close to random. For female workers the initial condition has a t-value of
slightly below 1.6, suggesting a correlation between the observation in 1990 and the
individual-specific random effects. The last two columns visualise the importance
of the initial condition with separate estimations by sub-period. While the initial
condition is insignificant for males and female workers for the first period, its coeffi-
cient for the second defined period (1994-1996) is strongly significantly positive. The
same holds true for the last sub-period. Note that the strong increase in the initial
condition’s importance again provides evidence for a dynamic selection process.
Turning to the long-run variables that measure across-regime dependence, we
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Table 9: Marginal Effects of the Initial Condition for the Low-wage Equation, by
Gender
Males Females Males Females
Initial Condition: low − wage Baseline Model Separate Estimation
1991− 1993 0.035 0.022 0.016 0.022
(0.022) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014)
1994− 1996 -0.009 0.006 0.226*** 0.194***
(0.017) (0.016) (0.077) (0.046)
1997− 1999 -0.026 -0.025* 0.294*** 0.224***
(0.017) (0.013) (0.079) (0.063)
Source: BASiD 2007, weighted sample.
Notes: The table shows the marginal effects of the initial condition low − wage1990 for the stochastic low-wage
process. The initial condition is interacted with two period dummies. The baseline estimate is for the period
between 1991-1993. The second period is the time between 1994-1996 and the third period captures the time
between 1997-1999. The coefficients for the baseline model report changes relative to the first period (1991-1993).
The marginal effects are estimated by averaging over 100 Halton draws. The last two columns report the estimation
results separated by the three periods. The initial conditions for the three periods are 1990, 1993 and 1996,
respectively. Each regression for the male (female) sample with interactions has 16312 (16465) observations with
2165 (2267) individuals. Asterisks next to coefficients indicate significance levels as follows: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%.
Detailed results on estimated coefficients are shown in the online appendix.
first focus on the effect of the number of years one was below the first decile between
1980 and 1989 on the probability of being low paid after Unification. Figure 5
illustrates the marginal effects for the variables 1-3 years below the first decile and
more than 3 years below the first decile. It shows that there is no heterogeneity
with respect to the first variable. For the second one, the figure’s middle part
shows that having experienced more than three years pre-unification low-pay raises
male workers’ low-pay probability in the first sub-period by about 2.5 percentage
points (t-value: 1.5), whereas the effect vanishes after 1993. For females, the point
estimates are positive throughout the post-unification period. Even though the
estimate is (weakly) significant only for the first sub-period, the results indicate
that across-regime dependence appears to be more persistent for female workers.
The separate estimations (right part) by sub-period support these findings. Overall,
we find (weak) evidence for across-regime dependence for workers who spent many
years in low-wage employment before Unification and that this effect disappears
for males. Note, however, that according to our discussion above, the estimates
for female workers may still be upward biased. Figure 6 shows the impact of pre-
unification labour market interruptions on the low-pay probability after Unification.
While there is no effect for males, females have a 2.6 percentage points higher low-
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Notes: The figure shows marginal effects and the corresponding 90% confidence intervals of the probability of being
low paid given the long-run persistence variables ”number of years an individual has been below the first decile
between 1980 and 1989” using a multinomial logit model with random effects and firm characteristics for the low-
wage state distinguished by time and gender. The marginal effects are estimated by averaging over 100 Halton
draws. Each regression for the male (female) sample has 16312 (16465) observations with 2165 (2267) individuals.
Detailed results on estimated coefficients are shown in an online appendix.
Figure 5: Long-run Dynamics - Number of Low-wage Years
pay probability during the first three years if they experienced more than four years
of cumulated labour market interruptions. The effect vanishes in the second and
third sub-period. Repeating the regressions separately (right part of the figure) by
sub-period shows similar results with a positive significant impact of ’high’ GDR
labour market interruptions for female workers for the first sub-period. Overall,
there appears to be no effect for male workers and a temporary effect for females.
Heterogeneity across Educational Groups. Thus far, the effects for the long-
run dynamics have been assumed to be equal across educational groups. To the
extent that the established across-regime dependence in Figure 5 results from hu-
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(2267) individuals. Detailed results on estimated coefficients are shown in the online appendix.
Figure 6: Long-run Dynamics - Number of Labour Market Interruptions
man capital devaluation, one might expect a stronger effect for high-skilled individ-
uals. To address this issue, we exclude individuals without any level of education
and repeat our regressions for the sub-population of medium and high-skilled in-
dividuals.18 Figure 7 illustrates the results for the whole sample period and its
sub-periods (based on the baseline model). Compared to the results above, having
one to three years of pre-unification low-wage experience has again no effect on the
18Repeating the regressions 5a and 5b of Table 6 shows that the covariances of the regime-
specific random effects are similar once we focus on skilled individuals. For males the covariance
is 0.006 and for females 0.285, albeit not significant. The variances of the FRG random effects are
higher for both groups.
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Figure 7: Long-run Dynamics for Skilled Individuals - Number of Low-wage Years
post-unification low-pay probability. However, the effects of having more than three
years of pre-unification low-wage experience show the same pattern with different
confidence intervals. While the formerly established significant estimates for female
workers lose their precision, the picture for male workers becomes more pronounced
especially for the first period (1991-1993) after Unification. Their low-pay probabil-
ity increases by 3.3 per cent if the number of GDR low-wage years exceeds three.
The effect, however, is not long lasting and turns out to be significantly negative
during the second period. While these findings lend support to the hypothesis that
genuine state dependence results from human capital devaluation, they also sug-
gest that formerly low paid men have been able to catch up with their highly-paid
counterparts within a relatively short period of time.
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Structural Change at the Sectoral Level. The use of short-time work may be
viewed as an indicator for a strong restructuring process. The associated mobility
patterns along with the fact that short-time work may give rise to systematically
lower earnings in our data may affect our estimates of state dependence. To assess
the robustness of our results with respect to short-time work, we exclude the sectors
that were particularly heavily affected by short-time work (manufacturing, agricul-
ture, and water, energy and mining) from our estimations. The results are similar to
the findings above. While there is slightly lower short-run low-pay state dependence
after 1990 for male workers, female workers tend to have higher persistence rates.
The initial conditions as well as the number of low-wage years prior to 1990 are
again not significantly different from zero.
6 Conclusions
Focussing on the economic and political transformation in East Germany, the aim
of this study was to investigate how one’s pre-unification relative economic position
determined one’s fortunes after Unification. In answering this question, we attempt
to improve our understanding about whether the transition from a centrally planned
to a market economy offers fundamentally new perspectives for those who, in eco-
nomic terms, were relatively deprived under the old regime. To address these issues,
we use a novel administrative data set, the BASiD data set, focussing on individuals
with a sufficiently long period of labour market experience during the pre-unification
regime. The data provides an ideal basis for our analysis as it allows us, first, to
identify individuals living in Eastern Germany before Unification and, second, as it
enables us to track individual employment histories both before and after the fall
of the Iron Curtain. To measure individuals’ relative economic position, we exploit
information on the incidence and duration of their position in the bottom part of
the pre-unification wage distribution.
In our empirical analysis, particular emphasis is given to the extent of genuine
low-wage state dependence during economic and political transition. We estimate
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dynamic discrete choice models taking into account the initial condition problem and
different specifications of unobserved heterogeneity and selection effects. First, we
show that unobserved factors are the main drivers of low-wage persistence and that
these unobservables are regime-dependent. Moreover, true state dependence in low-
wage employment after Unification is about nine per cent for males and 15 per cent
for females. This measure of persistence is rather constant across time, indicating
a strong dynamic selection process after Unification. By measuring across-regime
dependencies, our empirical strategy is twofold. We first exploit the modelling of
the initial condition in 1990. We show that the initial condition is not significant in-
dicating the exogeneity of the modeled stochastic process in terms of market-regime
unobservables. This supports the exogenous initial value assumption indicating that
the initial condition is uncorrelated with the unobserved individual-specific effect in
the post-unification period. We then proceed by using information on individuals’
pre-unification labour market outcomes and show that, consistent with theoreti-
cal considerations, economic dependencies across different political and economic
regimes are only weakly present. An individual with more than three years of expe-
rience below the first decile during 1980 and 1989 has a roughly 2.5 percentage points
higher probability of being in low-wage employment during the first three years after
Unification. Across all skill groups, this effect is weak and becomes smaller for male
and insignificant for female workers.
What drives these findings? As to across-regime dependence, signalling consid-
erations and the stigma-effect channel lead us to expect no relationship between
the pre- and post-unification relative wage position, if the heavily regulated pre-
unification labour market had precluded any selection into low-wage jobs based on
workers’ true productivity. The structure of the Eastern German labour market be-
fore 1990 characterised by control of labour supply and demand and its central wage
and price setting system indeed suggests that individuals’ productivity should have
been rather unconnected to their low-wage status. Given that general skills have
been shown to be transferable to the post-unification labour market, an alternative
explanation for the established, albeit weak across-regime persistence might stem
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from a loss in general human capital. Especially for men this hypothesis is borne out
by the estimates. The empirical results show that spending a reasonable amount of
time at the bottom of the wage distribution before Unification is associated with a
higher post-unification low-pay probability and that this effect is particularly pro-
nounced for medium and high-skilled workers. However, there is also evidence that
this effect was not long lasting. Taken together, especially for males our findings
provide good news for those who used to be relatively deprived under the socialist
regime. Those who were in the bottom of the socialist wage distribution are not
more likely of being low paid after Unification than their highly paid counterparts
and if there was any across regime state dependence it was weak and appears to
have vanished within a relatively short period of time.
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Appendix A: Aggregate State Dependence
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Source: BASiD 2007, weighted sample.
Notes: The figure shows the difference in the probability of being in low-wage employment given low-wage and high-wage employment
in t-1 using the pooled wage distribution. The first line marks the fall of the Berlin Wall. The second one marks Monetary Union.
Figure A.1: Aggregate state dependence, pooled wage distribution, by gender
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Source: BASiD 2007, weighted sample.
Notes: The figure shows the difference in the probability of being in low-wage employment given low-wage and high-wage employment
in t-1 and changing the low-wage threshold from the first decile before Unification to two-thirds of the median after Unification. The
first line marks the fall of the Berlin Wall. The second one marks Monetary Union.
Figure A.2: Aggregate state dependence, changing low-wage threshold after Unifi-
cation, by gender
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Appendix B: Data Description
Table B.1: Description of individual employment history
variables gained from the Pension Register
Variable Definition
Employment Status1)
EMPLOYMENT Employment spells include periods of employment subject to social
security contributions and (after 1998) marginal employment.
UNEMPLOYMENT Unemployment spells include periods of unemployment with and
without transfer receipt (only FRG).2)
NON-EMPLOYMENT Non-employment spells include periods of child raising, care giving
as well as periods with missing information on the employment status.
ILLNESS Illness spells include periods of long-term illness (FRG > 6 weeks;
GDR > 4 weeks before 1984, no minimum restriction afterwards).
TRAINING Training spells include periods of school or university attendance
after the age of 16 and periods of training and apprenticeship.
# UN(NON)EMPLOY- Number of un- or non-employment spells. An unemployment spell is
MENT SPELLS counted as a new spell if the gap between a preceding unemployment
spell exceeds four weeks.
1) Note that the recorded pre-unification pension activity histories are less precise than the post-unification histo-
ries. The reason is that the transfer of the activities was mainly based on former GDR citizens’ social security
cards. These cards record the number of months of employment, illness and maternity leave during a particular
year, but do not allow for tracking these spells on a monthly basis. As a result, compared to the pension spells
after Unification, which provide exact monthly information on all pension relevant activities, information on the
incidence of pre-unification employment, illness and maternity leave spells is available only on an annual basis.
2) A spell of unemployment in the Pension Register requires individuals to be registered as unemployed and to
obtain public transfers. The latter include benefits such as unemployment insurance, and - prior to 2005 - the
means-tested social assistance and unemployment assistance benefits. After 2004, unemployment and social
assistance were merged into one unified benefit, also known as ‘unemployment benefit II’ (ALG II). As the latter
targets only employable individuals, a spell involving the receipt of ALG II automatically fulfills the requirements
to be recorded as unemployed in the Pension Register. Prior to 2005, spells with social assistance benefits fulfill
the above requirements only if individuals were registered as unemployed. Otherwise they are recorded as non-
employment spells. As a consequence, the Pension Register does not permit a consistent definition of un- and
non-employment prior to and after 2005.
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Table B.2: Description of individual characteristics
gained from the Pension and Employment Statistics Register
Variable/Categories Definition
GDR-Spell GDR spells are identified based on the regional origin (Beitrittsgebiet)
of the pension contributions
Educational Status
LOW-SKILLED No degree or highschool degree (Reference category)
MEDIUM-SKILLED Completed vocational training
HIGH-SKILLED Technical college degree or university degree
Age Age in years
Occupational Type
WHITE-COLLAR White-collar worker (Reference: blue-collar)
Seniority
TENURE Number of previous months at current employer.
Employment interruptions a the same employer
may not exceed 6 months - otherwise tenure is
reset to zero after the employment interruption.
Earnings
EARNINGS Gross monthly earnings are retrieved from credit points to the German
Pension Insurance. GDR credit points are divided by a factor
as specified in Appendix 10 to the German Social Act (SGB VI).
One credit point corresponds to the average of yearly earnings of all
gainfully employed workers in (Western)Germany. Monthly earnings
are thus obtained by multiplying monthly credit points with the average
of earnings as documented in the Appendix 1 to the German Social Act
(SGB VI ). Credit points are reported up the contribution limit of the
German social security system.
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Table B.3: Definition of establishment characteristics
gained from the Employment Statistics Register
Variable Definition/Categories:
Establishment size Size ≤ 20 (Reference category)
20 ≤ Size < 50
50 ≤ Size < 200
200 ≤ Size < 1000
Size ≥ 1000
Workforce composition Share of employees younger than 30 years
Share of employees older than 50 years
Share of low-skilled employees
Share of female employees
Sector affiliation Agriculture/Forestry (Reference category)
Mining and manufacturing
Energy/Water supplies
Construction
Wholesale and retail trade
Transport and communication
Financial intermediation
Other service activities
Public administration
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Appendix C: The GDR Pension Formula
Table C.1: Calculation of GDR Pensions
Creditable years Minimum Fixed amount Maximum Maximum
for pension insurance amount (earnings independent) variable amount1) amount
(1) (2) (3) (4)
t < 15 330 170 90 330
15 ≤ t < 20 340 170 120 340
20 ≤ t < 25 350 170 150 350
25 ≤ t < 30 370 180 180 370
30 ≤ t < 35 390 190 210 400
35 ≤ t < 40 410 200 240 440
40 ≤ t < 45 430 210 270 480
45 ≤ t 470 210 300 510
Source: Rosenschon (1990). 1)The variable earnings dependent amount is one per cent
of average monthly earnings multiplied by the number of creditable years.
Earnings threshold above which earnings increase pension entitlements
calculated as 100·(Col. (1) - Col. (2))/(#Creditable years).
GDR pension entitlements were only to a limited extent earnings dependent.
Column (2) in Table C.1 shows that in 1989, pension rules stipulated an earnings
independent amount, which varied between 170 and 210 Mark (depending on the
number of contribution years). The additional earnings dependent amount corre-
sponded to one per cent of average monthly earnings multiplied by the number of
years creditable for the pension insurance. However, this variable component only
applied up to the contribution limit of 600 Mark. Thus, for an individual who
e.g. paid pension contributions for 40 years, monthly pensions were capped at a
maximum amount of 450 Mark (210 plus 40·6 Mark). The GDR pension system
also guaranteed a minimum pension amount that varied between 330 and 470 Mark
(again depending on the number of creditable years) shown in Column (1). For a
worker who earned on average 300 Mark per months during 40 years, this implied
that her pension earnings did not correspond to the amount according to the pension
formula (330 = 210 plus 40·3 Mark), but was rather fixed at the minimum pension
level of 430 Mark. Figure C.1 shows the earnings threshold above which earnings
increased pension entitlements. The threshold depends on the number of creditable
years for the pension insurance and is calculated as 100·(Column (1) - Column
(2))/(Number of creditable years). For example, the minimum pension level implied
that for a worker with 40 creditable years, the threshold of monthly earnings above
which earnings raised pension entitlements was 550 Mark. I.e., within the range of
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550 and 600 Mark additional earnings increased monthly pensions by an amount
of up to 20 Mark (corresponding to about five per cent of the minimum pension
level). In contrast, for a worker with 44 creditable years, the threshold of monthly
earnings above which higher earnings led to higher pensions was already reached at
500 Mark, giving rise to a potential increase in pension entitlements of more than
ten per cent of the minimum pension level (44 Mark). According to the German
Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, in 2012 the average number of creditable
years was 44.6 for Eastern German males and to 39.1 years for females.
Number of years creditable for pension insurance
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Figure C.1: Earnings threshold above which earnings increase pension entitlements
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Appendix D: Robustness Results for Online Publication
Pooled Wage Distribution (Section 5.1)
Given that the male low-wage threshold comes fairly close to the censoring point
we perform several robustness checks. To check the robustness of our results with
respect to the chosen threshold, we re-ran our specifications based on the first decile
of the pooled wage distribution as shown in Figure D.1. Note that from a welfare
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Figure D.1: Distribution of Pooled Wages between 1980-1989
perspective this is a reasonable strategy, as an individual’s relative economic posi-
tion is likely to be determined by the overall working-age population rather than by
(arguably narrowly defined) specific peers. While the pooled decile has the advan-
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tage that it is farther away from the censoring limit and thereby reduces the concern
of misclassifying males as falling below the censoring limit, it comes at the expense
of a considerably lower fraction of male workers obtaining a low wage (about five per
cent). Table D.1 shows the average partial effects for the pooled wage distribution.
Compared to Table 6, the APE for male workers is lower after Unification whereas
Table D.1: Average Partial Effects of Random Effect Probit Models using the Pooled
Wage Distribution, by Gender and Period
β constant β variable β constant β variable β variable
αi constant αi constant αi variable αi variable αi variable
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b) (4a) (4b) (5a) (5b)
Males Females Males Females Males Females Males Females Males Females
P (yt = 1|yt−1 = 1)− P (yt = 1|yt−1 = 0)
APEGDR 4.3 41.7 4.0 41.3 7.2 43.6 7.3 42.6 7.5 42.4
APEFRG 20.4 51.5 19.0 47.3 30.0 54.6 28.4 50.9 23.8 48.0
Random Effects
σ2 0.238 0.206 0.246 0.222
σ2GDR 0.371 0.413 0.310 0.367 0.264 0.370
σ2FRG 0.436 0.539 0.488 0.597 0.592 0.713
σGDR,FRG 0.171
† 0.183
Source: BASiD 2007, weighted sample.
Notes: The table reports the results from dynamic discrete choice probit models on the probability of being low
paid. yt = 1 denotes the low-wage status. All estimated average partial effects and variance estimates (†apart from
the covariance estimate for male workers with a significance level of 10%) are significant at the 5% level using 100
bootstrapped replications.
the variance estimate of unobserved heterogeneity increases slightly. For females,
both APE’s are higher with a slightly lower variance of the unobserved heterogeneity
terms. This is due to the fact that a lower fraction of male workers are considered as
low-wage employees while the fraction is higher among females. The covariance es-
timate for the regime-specific random effects are again highly significant for females
while for male workers the estimate is weakly significant at the 10% level. However,
the overall pattern of results obtained earlier are confirmed.
Moreover, given the fundamental changes the wage distribution underwent dur-
ing and after economic transition, one might argue that interpreting an escape from
out of the first decile into the upper deciles as a transition into the ”high-wage
sector” might be too restrictive after Unification. For this reason and to adopt a
more conventional definition of low pay, we re-run our specifications by defining the
low-wage threshold after 1989 as two thirds of the median wage. The quantitative
results do not change compared to Table 5 and Table 6.
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Low-Wage Threshold: First Decile (Section 5.2)
In section 5.2, we used the conventional threshold of two-thirds of the median.
This section provides robustness checks by using the first decile after Unification.
The upper panel of Table D.2 shows the main results using the baseline model
(full time period with interaction with sub-periods). The lower panel shows the
results by estimating the models separately for the sub-periods. The across-regime
Table D.2: Marginal Effects of Multinomial Logit Models with Random Effects,
Males, Low-Wage Threshold: 1st Decile
1991-1993 1994-1996 1997-1999
low-wage non-empl. low-wage non-empl. low-wage non-empl.
Baseline Model
Low − waget−1 0.077*** 0.004 0.172*** 0.043 0.275*** 0.018
(0.008) (0.023) (0.032) (0.029) (0.039) (0.051)
Initial condition
Low − wage 0.015 0.013 0.025 0.003 0.011 0.014
(0.014) (0.024) (0.016) (0.043) (0.014) (0.023)
# Low-wage years
1− 3 0.004 -0.002 0.001 -0.008 0.009 -0.008
(0.008) (0.016) (0.008) (0.018) (0.011) (0.019)
> 3 0.011 0.013 -0.030*** 0.008 -0.012 0.003
(0.018) (0.014) (0.011) (0.013) (0.019) (0.007)
obs. (total) 16312
LogLik -5665.6
Separate Estimation
Low − waget−1 0.149*** 0.098 0.100*** 0.001 0.096*** -0.047
(0.021) (0.079) (0.026) (0.021) (0.028) (0.033)
Initial condition
Low − wage 0.000 0.019* 0.206*** 0.024** 0.278*** 0.094***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.059) (0.015) (0.074) (0.033)
# Low-wage years
1− 3 0.004 -0.002 -0.003 0.001 0.002 -0.003
(0.007) (0.014) (0.008) (0.012) (0.010) (0.019)
> 3 0.010 -0.001 -0.033*** 0.027** -0.005 0.013
(0.016) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.021) (0.019)
obs. (total) 6252 5789 5469
LogLik -1788.7 -1945.8 -2087.1
Source: BASiD 2007, weighted sample.
Notes: †The reference category differs by gender. For males, the reference is zero labour market
interruptions; medium: up to six months; high: more than six months. For females, the reference
is zero to 12 months; medium: 12 to 48 months; high: more than 48 months. Robust standard
errors are in parentheses. All estimations contain a constant, the specified Mundlak-Chamberlain
device, and control for missings in the education variable. Control variables include age dummies,
education dummies, year dummies, regional dummies and experience dummies. The out of work
equation includes lagged dummy variables of white-collar, skilled and simple occupation. The low-
wage threshold ist the first decile of the wage distribution. The average marginal effects are estimated
by averaging over the average marginal effects of 100 Halton draws. Asterisks next to coefficients
indicate significance levels as follows: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%.
effects are again similar and not significant for male workers during the first three
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years after Unification. The short-run results (Low−waget−1) differ strongly which
reflects the difference in the chosen threshold. While in the baseline model state
dependence is increasing, the results from the separate estimations even point to
a slightly decreasing tendency (not significant). Given that the initial condition
becomes more important (lower panel), this points to a dynamic selection process in
the baseline model. The results for female workers are also in line with the findings
Table D.3: Marginal Effects of Multinomial Logit Models with Random Effects,
Females, Low-Wage Threshold: 1st Decile
1991-1993 1994-1996 1997-1999
low-wage non-empl. low-wage non-empl. low-wage non-empl.
Baseline Model
Low − waget−1 0.037*** 0.029** 0.120*** 0.107*** 0.147*** 0.111**
(0.006) (0.013) (0.020) (0.025) (0.028) (0.053)
Initial condition
Low − wage 0.023** 0.009 0.009 0.011 0.008 -0.038**
(0.010) (0.019) (0.011) (0.039) (0.012) (0.017)
# Low-wage years
1− 3 0.006 0.014 0.004 0.007 -0.004 -0.031
(0.007) (0.012) (0.009) (0.019) (0.009) (0.020)
> 3 0.026** -0.004 0.015 0.014 0.016 0.024***
(0.012) (0.015) (0.012) (0.018) (0.015) (0.005)
obs. (total) 16465
LogLik -5762.2
Separate Estimation
Low − waget−1 0.074*** 0.039 0.045** 0.026 0.041** 0.004
(0.016) (0.028) (0.021) (0.019) (0.019) (0.031)
Initial condition
Low − wage 0.025* 0.034*** 0.180*** 0.026* 0.190*** 0.119***
(0.014) (0.012) (0.076) (0.015) (0.057) (0.029)
# Low-wage years
1− 3 0.009 0.029** -0.001 0.007 -0.001 -0.019
(0.008) (0.015) (0.002) (0.014) (0.007) (0.018)
> 3 0.032*** -0.004 0.019 0.019* 0.019 0.040***
(0.013) (0.010) (0.014) (0.010) (0.012) (0.014)
obs. (total) 6593 5944 5418
LogLik -1755.0 -2060.5 -2023.3
Source: BASiD 2007, weighted sample.
Notes: †The reference category differs by gender. For males, the reference is zero labour market
interruptions; medium: up to six months; high: more than six months. For females, the reference
is zero to 12 months; medium: 12 to 48 months; high: more than 48 months. Robust standard
errors are in parentheses. All estimations contain a constant, the specified Mundlak-Chamberlain
device, and control for missings in the education variable. Control variables include age dummies,
education dummies, year dummies, regional dummies and experience dummies. The out of work
equation includes lagged dummy variables of white-collar, skilled and simple occupation. The low-
wage threshold ist the first decile of the wage distribution. The average marginal effects are estimated
by averaging over the average marginal effects of 100 Halton draws. Asterisks next to coefficients
indicate significance levels as follows: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%.
above. However, the initial condition is weakly significant at the 10%-level. The
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number of years below the first decile before 1990 is again significant during the
first three years after Unification and decreases in magnitude during the subsequent
years.
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